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THE INCIDENCE OF AN AMERICAN OIL
SEVERANCE TAX UNDER WORLD PRICING
BY OPEC: A NOTE
STEPHEN L. McDONALD*
Usually it is argued, and correctly, we believe, that in an economy
effectively insulated from oil imports a general oil severance tax is
borne almost entirely by consumers.' Like an excise tax on a single
commodity, the tax raises both short- and long-run marginal costs,
shifting the industry's short- and long-run supply curves upward on
the price axis. Given a quite inelastic national demand curve for oil,
the effect is to raise the equilibrium oil price by almost the amount
of the tax (the full amount of the tax if the demand curve is perfectly inelastic). To the extent that the demand curve has some
elasticity, the margin of oil exploitation is contracted and some of
the tax falls, in the long run, on land owners in the form of reduced
rent (lease bonus plus royalty). This is the result given by partial
equilibrium analysis, which is adequate for a problem of the present
sort.
If the oil severance tax is levied by all producing states but production is confined to a few states only, then the latter jurisdictions can
in effect shift some of the tax burden to consumers in other states.
Thus it generally is believed in the Southwestern states that the
burden of their oil severance taxes is borne largely by consumers in
2
other states.
The conclusion is somewhat different in the case of an oil severance tax levied by only one state producing a portion of the national
output of oil. The state confronts a demand curve that is more elastic
than the industry's curve, since the output of other areas is a close
substitute for its product, and more of the tax is borne by land
owners in the taxing state in the long run.3 By tending to raise the
relative price of oil in the taxing state, the tax increases the demand
for oil in other jurisdictions, raising prices and increasing land
owners' rents there. Thus the burden of the tax is borne partly by
land owners in the taxing state and partly by consumers in all states,
*Professor of Economics, University of Texas at Austin.
1. See, e.g., B. HERBER, MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 229 (4th ed. 1979).
2. All of the Southwestern states of Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, have
oil severance taxes. It has been estimated that 50 percent of the Texas tax is exported.
M. TOLLESON, TEXAS ENERGY ISSUES 1978, at 60 (1979).
3. McLure, Economic Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31
NATL TAX J. 257, 257-59 (No. 3, Sept. 1978).
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with the incidental effect of increasing rents in the non-taxing states.
The relative size of these effects depends upon the share of the
industry's capacity accounted for by the taxing state. If the share is
large, then the state's demand elasticity need not differ much from
the industry's, rents in the state will not decline much in response to
the tax, and the increase in prices and rents in other states will be
relatively greater. If the share is very small, the state's demand elasticity will approach infinity, rents in the state will bear nearly all of
the burden of the tax, and the rise in prices and rents in other states
will be minimal.
These comments on an oil severance tax levied by a single jurisdiction within a larger producing whole are relevant to the situation in
which the United States presently finds itself. Since the abandonment of oil import controls in 1973 the U.S. oil industry has not
been insulated from imports, and only price controls have kept the
domestic price of oil from being equal to the world price determined
and enforced by OPEC.4 Imports being near-perfect substitutes for
domestic oil, the elasticity of demand for domestic oil approaches
infinity at the price determined by OPEC. If freed of controls, the
domestic price of oil cannot rise above the world level, regardless of
changes in marginal costs and shifts in the domestic supply curve;
and it must be assumed that the world price, determined as a monopoly price by OPEC, is independent of marginal costs in the United
States. Given the world price, the higher are marginal costs in the
United States for whatever reason, including a severance tax, the
lower must be rents. In this sense, the full burden of the severance
tax is borne by land owners as recipients of rents.
As the United States decontrols oil prices, its situation may be
represented by the diagram in Figure I. DDus is the long-run demand
for oil in the United States; SSus is the long-run supply from domestic sources in the absence of a severance tax. Popec is the OPECdetermined free price in the United States, which is below the price
at which domestic supply would satisfy domestic demand. At the
OPEC-determined price the domestic demand for domestic oil is perfectly elastic along AG. Qtot is the total quantity of oil demanded at
the OPEC price, of which Qus is supplied from domestic sources and
the difference between Qus and Qtot is imported. Long-run rent paid
4. Reference to a single OPEC price is a simplification. As Walter Mead has reminded this
writer, there are at present several different OPEC prices in different member countries, and
there are spot prices determined in the market subject to OPEC production restraint. The
important point, however, is that the OPEC prices are determined independently of long-run
marginal costs in the United States.
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FIGURE I

Incidence of an American Oil Severance Tax
to domestic land owners (lease bonus and royalty) is the area ABC,
or the excess of price over long-run marginal cost. With a severance
tax equal to CF, the domestic supply curve becomes S'S'us. The
price goes no higher, but the quantity domestically supplied falls to
Qus and imports correspondingly increase. Long-run rent falls to the
area AEF. Consumers bear no more burden because of the tax; land
owners bear all of the increased burden in the form of reduced rent.
It does not matter to the analysis that the severance tax antedates
the OPEC-determined price, and that the large rise in price since
1973 greatly increased the rents received by U.S. land owners. Had it
not been for the severance tax, the price revolution would have
resulted in still greater rents to land owners, and the difference
would have been the difference between ABC and AEF. In the relevant sense, then, the burden of the tax falls, in the long run, on land
owners under OPEC pricing.
The results are similar if the severance tax is levied by a single
state, whether a large or a small producer, or if a particular state
levies a differentially high severance tax. The state can succeed only
in contracting the margin of exploitation in its jurisdiction and reducing its land owners' rents.
As the United States deregulates the price of oil and OPEC continues to price in its own interests, it no longer can be assumed that
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the oil severance tax in the United States is paid largely by consumers, that through the tax the oil producing states finance themselves partly at the expense of consumers in other states. No longer
can it be assumed that a state accounting for a large share of a
nation's oil producing capacity can, with little loss to its own land
owners, levy a differentially high severance tax. In the long run the
tax reduces rents and increases imports, without any effect on price;
and a differential tax by a given state contracts the margin of exploitation and reduces rents differentially in that state, without any
effect on price.

